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RELIGION AND ETHICS IN THE
THOUGHT OF RICHARD ULLMANN
T. Vail Palmer, Jr.

R

K. Ullmann (1904-1963) was born in Germany and received his Ph.D. from Frankfurt University. After a period in Buchenwald concentration camp, he left Germany in 1939 and eventually
settled in Birmingham, England. In 1946 he became a member of the
Society of Friends. He wrote many articles which were published in
The Friend (London) and a number of articles in other Quaker publications, particularly The Friends’ Quarterly and Der Quäker. Several
poems, in German, also appeared in Der Quäker. His more substantial
publications include the 1961 Swarthmore Lecture, Tolerance and the
Intolerable, and a posthumous Pendle Hill Pamphlet, The Dilemmas
of a Reconciler. His thought is expressed most completely in a 1955
essay, Friends and Truth, and in a book, Between God and History,
published in 1959.
ichard

Quakerism and Existentialism: A Dialectic
To understand the relationships between Richard Ullmann’s religious
thought and his ideas and actions in social ethics, we must begin with
his strong affirmation of “the dialectical nature of truth.”1 The term
“dialectical” has a variety of meanings in the history of philosophy and
of theology; but most of those who call themselves “dialectical” thinkers mean, at least, either that fuller truth is best approached through
dialogue between persons who hold contrasting views or that progress
in truth comes through the paradoxical affirmation of truths that appear
to contradict each other and the attempt to resolve that tension through
the development of a synthesis involving insights from both sides of
the paradox. Richard Ullmann clearly means that truth is dialectical in
both senses of the term.
Thus, he insists, beginning with whatever truth I now possess,
“more truth can be found only in boundless communication.”2 Furthermore, no statement of belief, however evidently false, can be simply
discarded or ignored; at the very least there is “the truth which is hidden
even in the most fallacious beliefs of our fellowman, namely, that his
11
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greatest error is still true in so far as it is a valid test of our own truth.”3
If this be the nature of truth, then even though there is such a thing
as “the deceiver” or “the false or the mistaken prophet,” nevertheless
“the publishing of truth is in itself full of ambiguities.”4
A consequence of the dialectical nature of truth, in both senses of
the term “dialectical,” is that the discovery of truth is a never-ending
process: “Search is an essential aspect of truth.”5 All presently affirmed
truth is of necessity incomplete; the very fact that the discovery of truth
proceeds endlessly is an assurance of yet more truth to be found: “Dissatisfaction with my present knowledge of truth is…profound certainty
about that greater truth which I do not know.”6
In the nature of the case, all dialectical systems of philosophy and
theology must be quite complex. This is certainly true of Ullmann’s
thought. It will be possible here only to examine those portions of his
system that most clearly point up the relationship between theology
and social ethics.
Richard Ullmann draws heavily on two sources for the basis of his
own theology: the seventeenth-century Quakers and twentieth-century
existentialists—particularly Karl Jaspers, but to some extent such thinkers as Gabriel Marcel, Paul Tillich, and Martin Buber. He describes his
method as “that of mirroring Quakerism in existentialist philosophy,”7
but it might be more appropriate to describe his approach as a dialogue
between early Friends and existentialists. Dialogue it must be, for no
individual or group can possess the whole truth. The failure to recognize
this point is, for Richard Ullmann, one of the primary shortcomings of
George Fox and the first Friends: “Fox’s unwarranted claim of infallibility…is a central part of his doctrines, and only if we grasp it as such,
need we not feel altogether discouraged by the fact that his certainty
has been lost for our generation.”8 A corollary of this weakness is an
equally unwarranted intolerance of the views of non-Friends: “Do not
Fox’s words…create the feeling that he and his Friends alone know
the truth or at least the only true way to truth?…This is, I am afraid,
just another kind of intolerance.”9
Parallel to their understanding of truth was the way in which early
Friends dealt with the paradox of the second coming of Christ and
the coming of the kingdom of God—the truths that Christ and the
kingdom have already come and that their full coming lies still in the
future: “Early Friends, however, do not conceive this paradox as a
tension within individual human experience, they try to solve the tension in a simple and direct way. The Kingdom, they hold, is altogether
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present and fulfilled for those who know that Christ is come into their
hearts as their immediate teacher; whereas it is still in the future for
those who have not yet been convinced.”10 Clearly, Ullmann finds this
solution altogether too “simple and direct.” Related to the early Quaker
conviction that, for them, the kingdom of God has already arrived is
what Ullmann calls Fox’s “historical ingratitude”:
The sweeping gesture with which he removed all history between
“the Apostles’ days” and the Second Coming of Christ as a “long
night of apostasy”…is symptomatic of the exaggerated view
which he has about inner guidance, as entirely divorced from all
temporal continuity.… Fox did not recognize any of the influences which had worked upon him, neither those of the spiritual
reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nor those of
such contemporaries as created for him, and together with him,
the historical climate for his ministry.11
But the method cannot be simply one of using existentialist insights
to correct the weaknesses of early Quaker thought, for there are also
weaknesses in the thought of the existentialists, even of Karl Jaspers,
on whom Richard Ullmann depends most heavily. For example, among
the existentialists, including Jaspers, “little positive thought is given to
the experience of the ‘we,’ not as depersonalized collective, but as true
community.”12 In particular, Jaspers omits an aspect of the “we” that
Friends have often emphasized: “Though Jaspers emphasizes repeatedly
that truth exists only in communication, I am not sure that corporate
guidance would have a place in his thinking.”13 Ullmann also accuses
Jaspers of an inadequate understanding of mysticism:
Jaspers…is certainly wrong when he asserts…that after what he
calls the “trance,” the mystic does “basically no longer understand” his experience even though he may “remember” it and
have his life changed by it. It is illogical to equate the inability of
communicating in words what is the most essential in mystical
experience, with a fading understanding of it. Jaspers speaks several times of self-communication and communication in silence,
but strangely enough our Quaker silence is for him no silence
of communication…. The mystics know what Jaspers is very
reluctant to think, and what apparently has not become lucid to
him at the boundaries of thought: that though he cannot master
Truth, he is still mastered by it; that though he cannot possess
Truth, he is still possessed by it.14
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In describing the early Friends here as mystics, Ullmann is apparently
using “mysticism” in its broadest sense to denote religious experience in
general; he is at pains elsewhere to deny that Quaker mysticism has much
to do with Hindu or Buddhist or even medieval Christian mysticism.
Thus when Richard Ullmann turns to the positive contributions
early Friends make to the dialogue, he is careful to correct some of the
popular contemporary misunderstandings of early Quaker thought.
He takes George Fox’s phrase, “that of God in every one,” which has
become a popular Quaker catchword today, and points out: “As a matter
of historical accuracy, the Quaker phrase of ‘that of God’ was neither
meant, nor often asserted to denote, a pantheistic Creative Power or
Life Force.” Instead, it simply points to “a God-given capacity” that
“enables man, and man alone in the known creation, to experience
God Transcendent intimately and immediately, and thus to encounter
Truth so that he is seized by it and knows it to be true and tries to
know it as, and express it in, his own truths. That capacity, however,
must not be identified with God himself, it is that from God rather
than that part of God.”15
One of the chief contributions of Quakerism, according to Ullmann,
is the understanding that truth is always subject to growth and change:
“The dynamic concept of truth has been one of the most characteristic
Quaker dogmas throughout our history.”16 More concretely, Quakers
have discovered that shared dialogue and communication can and do
lead to a shared experience of the presence of the transcendent God
and thus open the way for the development of full community, not
only among a few close-knit individuals but also among ever widening
circles of humankind:
Just as a self finds himself and his truth in the face of Transcendence, intercommunication may bring a group of selves
into a common experience of Transcendence in Presence.…
Intersubjectivity may, in intercommunication, work its way up
to an inclusive community or oneness in Truth, and this, as
the experience of Friends shows, not only in quite small circles.
Authentic communication achieved in this way…is full togetherness in which the members are concerned not so much with
seeking out one another in the search for truth than with receiving
truth in the common openness to Transcendence.17
Another important contribution of the early Quakers is the idea and
experience that the kingdom of God is already present in the midst of
his people: “It is the experience of the presence of the Kingdom and
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not the utopian hope for a territorial Kingdom on earth which prompts
Quaker action.”18
The contributions of existentialists to the dialogue begun with their
emphasis on the individual: “The relevance of existentialist philosophy”
is that “in an age where collectivism and depersonalization threaten to
deprive man of his individuality,…it has turned our eyes back to the
unconditional self, my self, my responsibility for myself, and the freedom
of my isolated ‘existence.’” This is even the case for existentialists such
as Buber and Jaspers who have also emphasized “that my self stands
individually and responsibly in relation not only to myself, but to other
selves and to the world and to what transcends the world. I have to
decide for myself what that relation is to be; and this can be done only
by me alone where I am most true to my self.”19
In terms of the discovery of truth, this means that “I cannot have
truth unless I find it in and for myself.”20 In this sense, the existentialists emphasize “the subjectivity of truth.”21 Ullmann also draws on the
existentialists for his insight that it is ultimate truth toward which we
move even though our search for it is always incomplete; he can affirm
“that inner certainty of truth eternal which upholds us though we can
never know it.”22 From the existentialists also comes the insight that
“truth is, and can be, mediated only in symbols and parables.”23 This
is particularly the case with religious truth: “All utterances about God,
from the mere fact that he transcends human thought, are of necessity
only parabolical.”24 Ullmann takes this point specifically from Paul
Tillich’s Love, Power, and Justice; he fails to note that Tillich later
insisted on one major exception to this generalization: “The statement
that God is being-itself is a nonsymbolic statement.…It means what
it says directly and properly.…Nothing else can be said about God as
God which is not symbolic.”25
In his understanding of history, Richard Ullmann is also very much
in line with existentialist thought: “The unique remains the most important factor in history.”26 But as he moves further with this line of
thought, we may suspect a weakness or incompleteness in his dialectic:
“I do not believe that God, having created man with the capacity of
having history, intervenes in history directly in the way proclaimed by
the prophets of old.”27 The problem is that neither early Friends, with
their “historical ingratitude” and their premature resolution of the
tension between history and the kingdom of God, nor existentialists,
with their essentially non-historical emphasis on the centrality of the
isolated individual, provide Ullmann with much of a handle to get hold
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of the ideas of God’s revelation and action in history. In order to do
justice to these ideas, which are quite basic to Christian faith, he would
have to bring some group such as the Hebrew prophets or the modern
“salvation-history” theologians more fully into the dialogue with the
existentialists and the early Friends. But this he hesitated to do. Perhaps
the dialogue with Marxist thought, which he was beginning to approach
at the end of his life, would eventually have provided him with a way
of dealing more concretely with the importance and reality of history
as a medium through which Transcendence could be expressed?
The heart of Ullmann’s dialogue between Friends and existentialist
thinkers emerges in his existentialist interpretation of some key themes
in early Quaker thought and experience. He can, for instance, reinterpret some typical early Quaker religious language:
It is at least inaccurate to assert that the experience of Christ
Within meant for early Friends the same thing as divine immanence.… Religious experience was for them an I-thou experience.… It seems quite possible for an on-looking witness to say
of a fellow-man that he is filled with God and his Spirit. For the
inspired person himself, however, it seems more fitting,…as a
more accurate description of his actual experience, to declare that
the Spirit of the Lord is upon him and that God speaks, not in
him and from him, but to him and through him. Such shades of
language are not without significance for the underlying truth.28
Ullmann says of the early Friends: “The truth they published was
that you cannot have truth unless you find it for yourself: truth is
existential.”29 Even the Quaker abstention from creeds can be seen as
a consequence of the symbolic, non-literal nature of religious truth:
“The miracle of conversion…consists in the possibility of communication…beyond the conveyance of contents.…The small group is released
from its separateness, the lonely soul from its bewilderment, because
they have suddenly been given a language to intercommunicate on
something that cannot be really communicated except to those who
already know.”30
The thought of Karl Jaspers can provide a fuller understanding of
the early Quaker practice of publishing truth: “For Quakerism, however, Jaspers’ analysis of communication yields an important insight,
namely that publishing truth is not only a declaration of truths already
found: it is an essential tool in our search for truths still to be found,
as truth is accomplished only in and through communication.”31 The
existentialist analysis of I-thou communication also helps to explain the
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method of the Quaker meeting for business: “If we check individual
guidance by corporate judgments, these are reached…by a corporate,
but corporately subjective, discernment of the spirit, achieved in intersubjective communication.”32

The Central Principle of Christian Ethics
Ullmann draws on existentialism for his central principle of Christian
ethics—the command to become our true, authentic selves: “Directives of attitudes are commandments to be what we are, to attain our
authentic self. The true self is the will of God for us.”33 This basic
principle drives behind the usual distinction in ethical thought between
teleological ethics (emphasizing goals or results of action, such as the
“utilitarian” emphasis on maximizing pleasure for the greatest number of people) and deontological ethics (emphasizing moral rules or
principles, the form of action, or the motive behind the action). “The
traditional distinction between utilitarian ethics and ethics of principle
falls to the ground.…Not what I hold on principle nor what I want
to achieve, but what I truly am, the will of God for me, makes me act
rightly. My whole self is involved.”34 In particular, we can never say that
any particular type or form of action is always automatically right: “It is
never a category of action as such which can rightly be called Christian,
but only an action in a situation undertaken by a fully authentic self.”35
The attainment of our true self comes most deeply in religious
experience, the I-thou encounter with God: “This, what we really are,
our authentic self, happens to us in the spiritual experience of encountering God. The revelation of God’s will is not like a moral law to be
executed, it is like a structure of being which is real, and which is real
not only as God’s will for you and me but also, as far as we can discern,
as God’s own Nature or Being.”36
Ullmann often uses the phrase, “structure of being,” to characterize the true selfhood which lies at the heart of authentic morality. It
is difficult to dig out precisely what he means by the term, “structure
of being.” One implication of the term, clearly, is the importance of
self-awareness: “The deeper a man’s awareness of the structure of
being, the more consistently will he fuse principle and expediency in
the concrete situation,…by his whole being expressing God’s will for
him.”37 Further, Ullmann makes a clear distinction between the true
self, the structure of being, and the historical conditions or situation
within which the self acts; a person “does not escape the tension between
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his true self and the conditions of action in which he is involved.”38
Although these two poles—structure of being and the conditions of
history—cannot be severed in practice, they can be distinguished in
basic theory: “The structure of being, the ground of our true self, is
therefore always intermingled with the stuff of history and incarnate in
our own historicity, and unfortunately never appears as unadulterated
as in our abstract thinking about it.”39
He does not go far beyond this in explaining the meaning of the
“structure of being.” But this reticence about his basic ethical principle
is characteristic of existentialist thought; to describe too concretely what
another person must be, let alone do, is to run the risk of depriving that
person of his ultimate radical responsibility to choose freely what he or
she is to be and to do. One consequnce is that existentialist thought
often moves toward a “situational” or “contextual” ethics, in which
only a full knowledge of a given situation (including the nature of the
self which is to act in that situation) can tell us what is right or wrong
in that situation. Richard Ullmann does avoid a complete contextualism in his ethics, but that is because of further principles he develops,
to supplement his basic principle of authentic selfhood.

The Development of Christian Ethics
Ullmann affirms the dictum that goes back to Socrates, that it is worse
to do wrong than to suffer from the wrongdoing of others; the Christian, he insists, “should consider his own peril the lesser of two evils.”40
This principle is also extended to actions that the Christian takes in
responsibility for the groups to which he or she belongs: “What the
Christian can and ought to do…is to recognize that he ought to ignore
unpleasant consequences for himself and, at least to a certain extent,
for his community, if the rightness of action in a concrete situation
depends on this.”41 Richard Ullmann carries this doctrine concerning
“unpleasant consequences” through to its logical conclusion, to cases
where death itself may be the consequence of an action: “We should
act as though death was the ultimate evil and the end of everything for
others, but not for ourselves.”42
Combining this emphasis on suffering rather than doing evil with the
existentialist insistence on absolute individual freedom and responsibility, Ullmann suggests that the highest form of moral action may take
the form of a creative risk: “The creative risk, taken with responsibility
and goodwill, is not sinful, however deep the sense of guilt, if a creative
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risk has led to destruction. On the contrary, if there were no risk, our
action would not be free and responsible.”43
He deepens the concepts of creative risk and of suffering rather than
doing wrong by seeing them in the light of the cross of Jesus Christ.
He discusses the decision of George Fox and the early Friends, during
the crisis of 1659, not to accept the invitation from Sir Henry Vane to
help forestall the restoration of the monarchy by becoming magistrates
and commissioners of the militia. An apparent “domestication” of the
earlier radical social protest of the Friends was implicit in this decision.
Richard Ullmann argues regarding Fox’s action: “Do we not see that his
‘domestication’ was a Christian choice under divine guidance, namely
the portentous final decision for suffering evil rather than inflicting it?
That he chose the cross of persecution rather than the bloody rule of
the saints?”44
Ullmann applies the example of the cross to such problems as the
conflict between truth and love which the reconciler often faces. “All
work and reconciliation depends on the reconciler’s own ability to
reconcile truth and love within himself,”45 and the supreme example
of such an inward reconciliation is “symbolized in the person of Jesus,
the reconciler between God and man, and man and fellow-man. The
means by which Jesus reconciled truth and love in and through himself
was the cross.”46
With his emphases on reconciliation, on creative risk, on treating
the death of others as the greatest evil, on the corporate dimension
of suffering rather than inflicting evil, it is no surprise that Richard
Ullmann strongly supports the traditional Quaker peace testimony.
“Our testimony is no testimony of prevention, reduction, resistance,
opposition and protest: it is a tremendously positive response to the
promptings of love, goodness, purity and truth,” he writes; “Our actions
will not be merely re-active to militarism and the threat of destruction,
but will respond actively, creatively and positively to the promptings of
the Spirit of Love, Truth and Peace.”47 This rejection of war under any
circumstances is perhaps his clearest departure from the “situational
ethics” of most existentialists.
What may be surprising is that he appeals to his basic ethical principle
of authentic selfhood or the structure of being, as a foundation for the
rejection of all participation in war:
Action undertaken in the responsibility of the authentic self
depends on the full inner awareness (though not necessarily
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fully grasped intellectually) of the structure of being. It is for
this reason that while some actions may sometimes be right and
at other times wrong (for instance, the offer or acceptance of an
alcoholic drink…), other actions like warfare or cannibalism can
never be right in any conceivable situation because they destroy in
themselves the structure of being which is the ground of true
selfhood, and are therefore self-destructive. So there are no actions which are as such Christian, but there are actions which are
never Christian.48
It is apparent that Ullmann intends to base the peace testimony in the
dialogue between existentialists and early Friends. What is not quite
clear is whether war destroys the structure of being in the person doing the killing, in the person killed, or in the relationships between
the two.
When it comes to the question of applying the Friends’ peace testimony to practical affairs, to social and political issues of the day, Richard
Ullmann refers to W. Grigor McClelland’s typology of the “prophet”
and the “reconciler” and puts himself squarely in the camp of the reconcilers. He thus opposes one of the programs favored by many radical
pacifists or “prophets,” Stephen King-Hall’s proposal for organized
training for non-violent national defense: “Our answer to Sir Stephen
should be: no training for non-violent resistance against the Russians,
but a deeper understanding of Christ’s way, and an unending search
for the heart of enemy and friend alike, in order to reconcile them.”49
In one respect, Ullmann is a rather unusual Quaker “reconciler.”
The typical reconciler tends to emphasize contacts with national and
United Nations officials and governmental bodies, urging the increased
use of negotiation, conciliation, and persuasion in international affairs.
Richard Ullmann, however, concentrated his efforts on work at the
“middle” level of influence- and opinion-leadership in society. In particular, he participated intensively in dialogues between American and
western European Christians and church leaders from eastern Europe,
held under the auspices of the Christian Peace Conference. In the last
two sections of this essay, I will discuss how these dialogues impacted
the development of his own thought.
I have suggested elsewhere that the prophet and the reconciler
tend to differ sharply in their fundamental social analysis. The reconciler, for one, “sees society, at every level, as a texture of relationships
between individuals.” For him “the essential ingredient for improving
international relations…is dialogue, conversation; and conversation is
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a relationship between individual perons.”50 Ullmann’s existentialist
emphasis on the individual and on dialogue certainly aligns him with
this type of social analysis. I have also suggested that the weaknesses
of this type of social theory include “its failure to take into account
the corporate dimension of human society, the interdependent reality
of social groups and of individuals in their acts and behavior, and its
consequent lack of any serious grappling with the problem of power as
a primary factor in the interaction, at various levels, of social groups.”51
This criticism appears to be borne out in relation to Ullmann’s discussion of justice and love. He writes:
Justice consists of weighing right and wrong, but love carries
neither scales nor a sword.…
Justice, it appears, is not the road to love; it is rather a stumbling
block on it.…
Only the yielding of one’s rights, the willingness of taking risks
instead of imposing them on others;…only the policy of selfeffacing love can bring us nearer to human brotherhood.52
This rejection of justice as a social ideal does not imply any unconcern
for the plight of the poor and the oppressed: “Happiness, brotherhood
and wholeness are a matter of being, namely of men and women being
more closely the selves they are meant to be. The condition of being,
however, is having, namely having the minimum livelihood in order
to be healthy and happy for oneself and one’s nearest and dearest, and
indeed having in order to be able to share both by giving and receiving.”53 To be able to make such an affirmation without insisting on
justice as a first step toward love and brotherhood would seem to be
possible only if one overlooks the power of entrenched social structures
in perpetuating wide divergences in personal wealth, the dimension
of social power that is often referred to as institutionalized injustice.
Richard Ullmann’s emphasis on dialogue as central to interpersonal
relations and to society as a whole leads him to emphasize speech
and conversation as a form of religious and social action. He refers
to “speech, that most directly ‘telling’ of all human actions.”54 One
consequence is that “the sharp separation of freedom of opinion and
speech from freedom of action is quite unrealistic. Human speech is
one of the most effective forms of human action, for good and ill.”55
His emphasis on speech, on dialogue, on communication leads him
to emphasize tolerance as a fundamental social value. He bases the
call to tolerance on fundamental premises of Quaker theology: “The
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Universal Inner Light, the Light of Christ shining in every man, the
realization of God’s inward immediacy to each soul through whatever
outward mediation, makes tolerance a necessity of thought.”56 In
particular, tolerance is a necessity in the continuing quest for truth:
“Tolerance is the very battleground on which the war for truth must
be waged.”57 This is because the very dialogue that is essential to the
discovery of further truth is possible only if there is mutual tolerance
among the parties to the dialogue: “Just because more truth can be
found only in boundless communication, it is through tolerance, which
alone makes such communication possible, that truth is stood for and
falsehood denied.”58
Ullmann insists that tolerance is not to be confused with mere
indifference about the beliefs of others which we tolerate:
Tolerance, far from being indifferent, depends on the fact of difference: it is a way of meeting difference which has been clearly
recognized as such; and we cannot meet difference unless we
are sufficiently interested in it to feel its challenge and to wrestle
with it.…
Before we ever become capable of tolerance, and before it can
ever exist in any true sense, we must be shaken by the recognition that there are profound differences between ourselves and
others, and that nobody can be really indifferent to the truths
which imbue his whole existence.59
The ultimate test of tolerance comes when we come face to face with
that which is intolerable, and “injury of the humanity of man by man
is the intolerable, as far as we humans can conceive it.”60 Examples of
the intolerable would be National Socialism in Germany during the
1930s and apartheid as practiced until very recently in South Africa.
The Christian must not oppose the intolerable by forms of attack
or resistance—violent or non-violent—which seek to destroy the perpetrator of that evil. The final answer to the intolerable, the ultimate
expression of tolerance, is the way of Jesus Christ, symbolized and
exemplified by the cross:
It is, then, the message conveyed by the life and death of Jesus
Christ, not as preached in sermons and observed in churches and
meeting houses—it is Jesus’ own witness to his cross which contains the exemplary answer to our problem. Standing for truth,
resisting in love, enduring to the last, this was his threefold way
when he confronted man’s inhumanity with his divinely human

religion and ethics in the thought of richard ullmann • 23

dignity.…Through the manner of his living and dying, the cross of
Christ has emerged as the supreme symbol and pattern of meeting
the intolerable by something far greater than tolerance. Wherever
the cross has been seen, understood and experienced in this way,
it has redeemed and fitted human beings to take upon themselves
the loving struggle for truth, at whatever cost.61

Dialogue with East-European Christians
Richard Ullmann’s entry into dialogue with east-European Christians
has been dramatically depicted by his widow:
Like all western Christians, Richard met Christians in the East
very critically. A decisive breakthrough came for him in Frankfurt in 1959, when for the first time he met church leaders from
the East. He expressed himself so freely and openly that he was
greatly astonished when he was then and there invited to Prague.
In Frankfurt he did not foresee how strongly this movement
would capture his heart. Now in Prague he saw that there were
real Christians in the East, who answered for their faith amidst
great outward and inward struggles, and that their work for world
peace was just as genuine as that of the contenders for peace in
the West. Only the vocabulary was different.62
The Frankfurt meeting was a theological conference for East-West understanding, held January 10-13, 1959. The Prague meeting, to which
Lene Ullmann referred, was the second Christian Peace Conference,
April 16-19, 1959. Richard Ullmann also attended the third Christian
Peace Conference, in Prague, September 6-9, 1960. Meanwhile he had
been appointed to a small working commission of the C.P.C., which
planned and organized the first All-Christian Peace Assembly. He met
with this commission April 20-22, 1960, in Debrecen, Hungary.
At the All-Christian Peace Assembly, held June 13-18, 1961, in
Prague, Richard Ullmann gave one of the major addresses, on the
topic, “From the Cold War towards Real Peace.” Immediately after
that assembly, in response to a last-minute invitation, he and his wife
flew to Moscow for a one-week visit.
In December 1962, he addressed a regional conference of the Christian Peace Conference, in Driebergen, Netherlands, on the topic, “Peace
and Freedom.” Immediately before that meeting, he had been named a
Vice-President of the Christian Peace Conference. Shortly afterwards,
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on December 11, 1962, a regional committee of the Christian Peace
Conference was formed in Great Britain, with Richard K. Ullmann as
its chairman. His work for the C.P.C. was brought to an end by his
death in August 1963.

Dialogue with Marxism
Although Ullmann did not himself have many direct contacts with
Marxists or with persons from eastern Europe other than church leaders,
he did give close attention, in his posthumous Dilemmas of a Reconciler, to the report by a group of five American young Friends, of their
summer tour with three young Russians (Paul Lacey, ed., Experiment
in Understanding, Washington, D.C.: Young Friends Committee of
North America, 1959). He noted particularly the problems and potentialities of the discussions and dialogues among these Quaker and
Marxist young people.
It is not surprising that Richard Ullmann has more to say about
Marxist thought and practice in his writings from 1959 on, than in
what he had written earlier. His earlier comments had mainly been
negatively critical of Marxism. In his references to Marxism and to the
Soviet Union after 1958, his approach becomes more one of critical
appreciation. He strikes the keynote for this approach in his address to
the 1961 All-Christian Peace Assembly:
As long as we look at things from an ideological viewpoint, we
cannot see people as Christian.…
Our thoughts fail to meet one another as long as we think
statically and ideologically.…Instead we must discover on all sides
the buds of dynamical developments.63
In the context of this address to Christians from both sides of the Iron
Curtain, he makes it clear that the “ideological viewpoints” to which
he refers include both the rigid anti-Communism of many western
Christians and the uncritical support given by many eastern Christians
to Communist interpretations of international issues.
He also makes it clear that Marxism itself is not always rigidly bound
to a static ideology, and he criticizes those who persist in viewing Communism as monolithic:
We are so sure of the monolithic character of communist societies
that we bother very little with the signs of life even within the
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framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology (“they are all alike”).64
Historically…Soviet Communism has already been through very
different stages and has very different aspects, some of which were
due to its reactions to Western aggression.65
One question in which Ullman is interested is that of the relationships between Communism and Christianity. In particular, he insists
that the sharp anti-communism of many Christian spokesmen “is most
welcome to the Communist leaders, because it confirms so clearly their
doctrine of the inherent and ‘corrosive’ evil of Christianity and all
religion. These leaders are far more bewildered by Christians who cooperate with them both with appreciation of their constructive efforts,
and with Christian, critical detachment regarding obvious wrongs. This
attitude does not fit their books.”66 The major developments during the
1960s, in the way of Christian-Marxists dialogues in Europe, had not
taken place when Ullmann wrote this. By 1965 or 1968, had he lived,
he could have noted that a number of Marxist thinkers were finding
ways of fitting these newer Christian attitudes into their understanding
of religion. But even in his visits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary in 1959 and 1960, Richard Ullmann is able to note the mutual
perplexities of Christians and Communists, the type of ferment which
is about to break open into full dialogue: “I am deeply moved by the
perplexities under which people over there live and work: not only the
Christians but, through their Christian witness, the Communists.”67
One aspect of the relationship between Communism and religion
is the question of religious toleration in socialist countries. Ullmann
points out that official Marxist atheism does not result, as many in the
West believe, in a policy that aims at the ruthless extermination of all
religion:
Let us…look at the major criticism made by Christians against
Communism, namely, its atheism. Most Communists would deny
with sincere passion that they infringe religious toleration. All
they demand is that Christians, Jews, Mohammedans or Buddhists living in their realms should have a positive attitude to the
socialist structure of their society.…
The demand for conformity to the laws of the land and the
structure of socialist society is not fundamentally different from
what many Western societies expect from their own Christian
citizens.…
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It is no longer possible to think of the atheistic propaganda in
Communist countries as a form of religious persecution, except
perhaps in the German Democratic Republic where the more
active interference with religious liberty is probably due to the
fact that its churches are organizationally affiliated with the West
German churches.…People are free to retain their faith if they
accept certain civic disabilities, of a kind similar to those suffered
by non-conformists and Roman Catholics in this country before
emancipation and enfranchisement, a hundred and thirty years
ago.68
All in all, Richard Ullmann neither accepts Communist atheism nor
attacks it as an intolerable evil:
If we reject Communist atheism, as we must, because it deprives
man, as the image of God, of his security in God, we still cannot
reject it as the intolerable, but only as a different faith which must
be opposed on the battleground of tolerance, precisely in the way
in which we would have to oppose the atheism or, better, nontheism of Buddhism. On the battleground of tolerance we must
struggle for deeper insight and greater truth.69
He goes an important step further, as do such theologians as Paul
Tillich, and insists that Marxist theory is not as starkly atheistic and
materialistic as it may appear or claim to be, on the surface. There is, at
the very least, a genuine dimension of transcendence in Marxist thought:
Without faith in the experience of, and the encounter with, the
Transcendent, in the reality of what really transcends world and
time, we have no possibility of discovering meaning in history.
This assertion will be strongly denied by non-religious thinkers
whose philosophy of history seems capable of dispensing with concepts such as faith and revelation, and even with all metaphysics.
Whether they know it or not,…whosoever finds meaning in life
or history cannot but base it on certain “assumptions”…. They
result from a man’s confrontation with the Transcendent which
he may wish to deny because he cannot grasp it…. In this way,
“atheistic,” “scientific” Marxism lives by the faith in an inexorable
goddess: History, who reveals herself in dialectics analysed by the
priests and theologians of the Communist Party.70
Ullmann similarly avoids a simplistic repudiation of Marxist “materialism.” He insists that for Marxists material goods are not themselves
the ultimate goal of human activity but are rather themselves means
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to the attainment of more inclusive forms of human happiness: “We
must not think…that the ameliorating social activities of other agencies
are normally aimed at nothing more than the material advancement
of people. This is not true even for Marxism, whose declared aim is
furtherance, through material advancement, of ‘the true happiness of
the people’ while at the same time decrying religion as an other-worldly,
hence ‘illusory happiness.’”71
He believes that we can learn from Marxist analysis of western
concepts of freedom as ideological concepts justifying bourgeois society: “The marxist critique of the bourgeois-individualistic notion of
freedom was quite as necessary as was the critique of existentialism of
the marxist concept of science by which the ultimate inner freedom of
the Self, intangible for society, is denied. We have learned one thing
from marxist criticism, that the notion of freedom which may satisfy
the sense of freedom, is largely influenced by the ideas of freedom
prevailing in a society.”72
Another aspect of Marxist thought, which he subjects to criticism,
is Karl Marx’s notion that all of history, up to the time of the proletarian revolution, is simply “pre-history.” Richard Ullmann finds more
adequate Berdyaev’s characterization of the present and of the coming
ages, respectively, as “history” and “meta-history”: “The use of ‘metahistory’ for the time of utopia is more adequate than Marx’s attempt
at calling the time of his utopian classless society ‘the true history of
mankind,’ while dubbing ‘pre-history’ all ages before it. Is it for this
reason that Marxists cherish so many ‘pre-historic’ methods of thought
and action?”73
Ullmann reserves even sharper criticism for two basic themes of
Marxist thought: the notion of class war and the idea that the individual
is the product of society:
As far as it is built on the idea of class war and hence on the
ruthless elimination of the class enemy by whatever means, it is
intolerable.…The real difficulty is not Communism as a system,
but its many intolerable practices which are rooted in the fallacious
assumption that man is the product of society. Society is not the
product of man either, as Western individualism has taught. It is
the nature of man that he exists only in society, and that all human morality derives from this mutual relationship. Communism,
with its one-sided doctrine, presumes (unsuccessfully, of course)
to treat man as a mere object of society, that is, in practice as an
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object of the people in power. To this extent, Communist doctrine
is obnoxious and intolerable.74
He insists, however, that these intolerable aspects of Marxist theory
are not all-pervasive but are strictly limited in scope. Much more
fundamental is his appreciation of Marxism’s redemptive concern for
man’s essential humanity: “Communism, as an ideological system, far
from denying the humanity of man, tries to redeem it even in the class
enemy wherever this is thought possible; that is, it tries to save man
from …his self-estrangement.”75
In particular, Ullmann expresses a critical appreciation of Marxism’s
devotion to equality and human welfare. In particular, these aspects of
Marxist thought serve to differentiate Communism sharply from such
social systems as Nazism and Apartheid:
Ideologically: Apartheid works for the inequality of man, Soviet
Communism for greater equality. For this reason, I hold firmly,
Soviet Communism is capable of redemption, Apartheid not.
Historically: the class society in Eastern countries which was
broken by Communism was horribly unjust and, in this injustice, claimed to be Christian, just like Apartheid. Admitted that
Communism itself is socially more stratified than it supposes, and
that it, too, has often used horrible violence, it does care fundamentally for the welfare of its people, as any welfare State does.76
He has a similar attitude toward Soviet policies aimed at world
peace: “We…should look twice before identifying the Christian Peace
Conference of Prague with communist mass demonstrations which are
concerned for ‘peace’ in the one-sided way of Soviet policies. Still, I
would add that we should not underrate the genuine desire for peace
even in the communist call for ‘co-existence.’”77
In these scattered references to Marxism, Richard Ullmann raises a
number of issues that clearly invite further discussion and study. He is
barely on the verge of an open Christian-Marxist dialogue—a dialogue
that was to blossom in the years immediately after his death. We can
only imagine that the opportunity to enter into that ongoing dialogue
might well have enriched the dialectic of his own Christian ethics.
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